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Deficits in social cognition are an evident clinical feature of the Asperger syndrome
(AS). Although many daily life problems of adults with AS are related to social cognition
impairments, few studies have conducted comprehensive research in this area. The
current study examined multiple domains of social cognition in adults with AS assessing
the executive functions (EF) and exploring the intra and inter-individual variability. Fifteen
adult’s diagnosed with AS and 15 matched healthy controls completed a battery of social
cognition tasks. This battery included measures of emotion recognition, theory of mind
(ToM), empathy, moral judgment, social norms knowledge, and self-monitoring behavior
in social settings. We controlled for the effect of EF and explored the individual variability.
The results indicated that adults with AS had a fundamental deficit in several domains
of social cognition. We also found high variability in the social cognition tasks. In these
tasks, AS participants obtained mostly subnormal performance. EF did not seem to play
a major role in the social cognition impairments. Our results suggest that adults with
AS present a pattern of social cognition deficits characterized by the decreased ability
to implicitly encode and integrate contextual information in order to access to the social
meaning. Nevertheless, when social information is explicitly presented or the situation can
be navigated with abstract rules, performance is improved. Our findings have implications
for the diagnosis and treatment of individuals with AS as well as for the neurocognitive
models of this syndrome.
Keywords: Asperger syndrome, contextual social cognition, executive functions, individual variability
INTRODUCTION
Social cognition refers to specific information processing involved
in the successful navigation of challenges related to survival and
reproduction in social species (Adolphs, 1999). The construct of
social cognition involves several domains, including emotional
processing, theory of mind (ToM), decision-making, empathy,
moral judgment, and social norms knowledge, among others.
Despite the seemingly differences in these components, some of
them require similar underlying processes. Multiple social cogni-
tion domains require the spontaneous perception of the relevant
social elements of the situation and the interpretation of how
these elements create a given social context (Klin, 2000), which
depends on the implicit inference of contextual clues that bias
the social meaning of an action (Ibáñez and Manes, 2012). For
example, emotional recognition of a face usually occurs within
a background that includes emotional body language and other
convergent information such as prosody, gestures, and situa-
tional clues. In contrast, other processes may require the use
of explicit and abstract rules about the general social setting in
terms of conventions or expected behaviors (e.g., explicit social
norms during specific social interactions). Thus, different strate-
gies underlie the different social cognition domains. Here, we
investigate different aspects of social cognition in adults with
Asperger syndrome (AS).
AS is a pervasive developmental disorder characterized by
severe and sustained impairments in social interaction and the
development of restricted, repetitive patterns of behavior, inter-
est, and activities. These disturbances must cause significant
impairments in social, occupational, or other important areas of
functioning (American Psychiatric Association, 1994;Matson and
Wilkins, 2008). AS may be distinguished from autistic disorder by
a lack of delay in early language development (Baron-Cohen et al.,
2005). Because the main focus has been on early recognition and
diagnosis, this syndrome has primarily been studied in children.
However, given that AS is a chronic lifelong condition and nuclear
symptoms persist, research in adults has recently received partic-
ular attention (Fombonne and Tidmarsh, 2003; Lugnegard et al.,
2011).
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Recent reports suggest that adults with AS exhibit deficits
in multiple social cognition domains including face recogni-
tion, emotional processing, ToM, empathy, and moral judgment
(see below). Nevertheless, previous studies have not taken into
account several factors that should be considered simultaneously
in the social cognition research of these individuals. These fac-
tors include: (1) the simultaneous assessment of multiple social
cognition domains, (2) the sample selection, (3) the assessment
of executive functions (EF), and (4) the cognitive heterogene-
ity of the AS. In the present study, we considered all of these
aspects, which are essential for establishing the underlying fac-
tors that contribute to the social cognition deficits of adults
with AS.
SOCIAL COGNITION DISTURBANCES IN ADULTS WITH AS
Emotional processing is an emerging topic of interest. There are
numerous reports of individuals with autism spectrum disorders
[autism, high functioning autism (HFA), and AS] being impaired
in both recognition (Hobson et al., 1988; Ashwin et al., 2006;
Hubert et al., 2007; Atkinson, 2009) and production of emotional
expressions (Macdonald et al., 1989). Studies focused in adults
with AS (Philip et al., 2010) show deficits on emotion recog-
nition from faces [especially negative emotions (Ashwin et al.,
2007; Falkmer et al., 2011)]. Thus, evidence suggests that emo-
tional processing is affected in AS and other autism spectrum
disorders.
ToM is another area of interest in AS research, since it requires
the ability to infer the beliefs, intentions, and emotions of others
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). Adults with AS have difficulty under-
standing the intentions (cognitive ToM) and emotional impact of
others’ actions (affective ToM) as assessed by the Faux Pas Test
(FPT) (Zalla et al., 2009). However, reports of adults with AS
with the reading the mind in the eyes test (RMET) have shown
impaired (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001)
and preserved performance (Roeyers et al., 2001; Ponnet et al.,
2004; Spek et al., 2010). These controversial results have been
explained by the features of the RMET since correlations between
RMET and other ToM measures are weak (Luzzatti et al., 2002;
Spek et al., 2010).
Impairments in empathy, the capacity to share and understand
the emotional states of others in reference to oneself (Decety and
Moriguchi, 2007), are also a feature of the AS. Nevertheless, few
studies have examined empathy in adults with AS. Themajority of
the studies (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004; Rogers et al.,
2007) have focused on self-report questionnaires. However, other
reports (Dziobek et al., 2008) have represented an experimental
assessment of empathy in adults with AS. These studies show that
these patients are impaired in cognitive empathy but do not differ
from controls in emotional empathy.
Finally, one study recently reported that participants with AS
andHFA participants exhibit specific impairments in moral judg-
ment. Participants made atypical moral judgments when they
needed to consider the intention of harm (accidental vs. inten-
tional) and the outcome (neutral vs. negative) of a person’s
actions (Moran et al., 2011). These participants were unable to
judge the moral difference between accidental and attempted
harms.
RELEVANT FACTORS IN AS SOCIAL COGNITION RESEARCH
As we mentioned above, to establish the underlying factors that
contribute to the social cognition deficits of adults with AS, it
is essential to consider several factors. First, to explore the social
cognitive deficits in adults with AS, it is important to examine
multiple domains with different tasks. Implicit social cognition
tasks would require the spontaneous perception of the relevant
contextual elements of the situation (Klin, 2000). Conversely,
in explicit social cognition tasks the elements of the situation
are clearly defined and these can usually be solved with rela-
tively abstract and universal rules learned by explicit knowledge.
Individuals with AS fail when they need to spontaneously apply
social reasoning abilities to solvemore naturalistic tasks, butwhen
explicit information is provided, they improve the performance
(Klin, 2000; Senju et al., 2009; Izuma et al., 2011). Thus, to assess
several social cognition domains with different contextual clues
involvement allows for a more comprehensive evaluation, and it
makes it possible to establish whether there is a common factor
that explains the adults with AS social cognition deficits. However,
until now, only a few studies have simultaneously tested more
than one social cognition domain.
Furthermore, most of previous social cognition reports
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Baron-Cohen andWheelwright, 2004;
Moran et al., 2011; Zalla et al., 2011) have included subjects
diagnosed with AS and patients with other autism spectrum
disorders (e.g., HFA). Therefore, the findings of these investiga-
tions can be biased by the sample selection. There is an ongoing
debate about the differentiation among autistic subtypes, espe-
cially between AS and HFA. According to the DSM-IV criteria
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994) for autism, not for AS,
delay in language and qualitative impairments in communication
must be evident. However, several studies suggest that there is not
only a difference in language abilities among HFA and AS (for a
review see Matson and Wilkins, 2008). Unlike HFA, individuals
with AS do not have delay in early cognitive functioning (Frith,
2004). Furthermore, AS compared to HFA individuals have more
accentuated visual-motor deficits (Klin et al., 1995; Noterdaeme
et al., 2010), less strong impairments in verbal comprehension
(Noterdaeme et al., 2010; Planche and Lemonnier, 2012), higher
verbal than performance IQ (Klin et al., 1995) and less severe
behavioral abnormalities (Gilchrist et al., 2001). These evidences
suggest that both of these disorders should be studied as separate
diagnostic entities (Matson and Wilkins, 2008).
On the other hand, EF are required for the processing of
emotional stimuli and social cognition tasks (Pessoa, 2008;
Uekermann et al., 2010). Emotional processing requires holding
stimuli in the working memory, and irrelevant information needs
to be inhibited. In the same vein, ToM and empathy entail holding
information in the working memory and switching between one’s
own perspective and that of another person (Uekermann et al.,
2010). Nevertheless, no studies on adults with AS have controlled
for the effect of EF on social cognition performance.
Finally, adults with AS perform variably among multiple
domains (Hill and Bird, 2006; Towgood et al., 2009). This vari-
ability is observed more frequently in EF but also in social
cognition. Deficits in working memory, cognitive flexibility and
inhibitory control have been reported (Morris et al., 1999;
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Ambery et al., 2006; Hill and Bird, 2006), while other studies in
adults with AS (Just et al., 2007; Nyden et al., 2010) have found
preserved executive functioning. Affected (Baron-Cohen et al.,
1997; Zalla et al., 2009) and intact performances (Ponnet et al.,
2004; Spek et al., 2011) on ToM tasks have also been reported.
These mixed findings suggest that patterns of deficits vary from
individual to individual and that the adults with AS population
include patients with both sub-normal and supra-normal perfor-
mance. Thus, AS is more likely to be associated with a complex
pattern of deficits across and within domains rather than just a
single primary processing deficit (Happe et al., 2006). The het-
erogeneity in AS individuals has been interpreted as an obstacle
to research (Happe et al., 2006). Traditional group-study type of
analysis is problematic for individuals with high variability in per-
formance because of the averaging artifact (Shallice and Evans,
1978).
THE GOAL OF THIS STUDY
The primary goal of this study was to examine the performance of
adults with AS on multiple social cognition domains with differ-
ent levels of contextual integration while assessing the influence of
EF. The social cognition domains evaluated were emotion recog-
nition, ToM, empathy, moral judgment, social norms knowledge,
and self-monitoring behavior in social settings. We included some
tasks that require the implicit perception and integration of the
relevant social elements to solve a social situation, and other in
which the elements of the situation are explicitly defined and can
be solved with relatively abstract and universal learned rules. In
adittion, we explored the individual variability in the AS group.
For this purpose, we employed a methodology called multiple
case series analysis (MCSA) (Hill and Bird, 2006; Towgood et al.,
2009), that detects the domains in which a given individual
displays an abnormal performance. Group comparison analy-
ses requires homogeneity between subjects; however, individuals
with AS exhibit performance variability, which is concealed in
these analyses. Therefore, the lack of significant differences is not
necessarily an index of intact performance in this population (Hill
and Bird, 2006).
Taking previous findings into account, we predicted that adults
with AS will have deficits in several social cognition domains. We
hypothesized that the social cognition deficits of adults with AS
would be more related to impairments in the capacity to implic-
itly integrate action intentions with contextual clues than to the
inability to apply explicit social rules. We also hypothesized that
the social cognition difficulties would not be explained by EF
profiles. This hypothesis was based on the fact that deficits in
social cognition seem to be a fundamental characteristic that is
less affected by AS heterogeneity, while patterns of EF have shown
high variability between individuals. Finally, we predicted that the
MCSA should demonstrate that patterns of cognitive strengths
and weaknesses vary within individuals.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Fifteen adult’s diagnosed with AS and 15 healthy subjects partic-
ipated in the present study. All participants were selected from
the outpatient population of the Institute of Cognitive Neurology.
All adults with AS had an estimated IQ above 94 (SD ≤ 7.42).
Patients were assessed by a psychiatrist and met the diagnos-
tic and statistical manual of mental disorders (DSM-IV) criteria
for AS (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). The diagnosis
was made on the basis of the adult Asperger assessment (AAA)
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2005). Before the clinical interview, patients
are asked to complete autism spectrum quotient (AQ) and the
empathy quotient (EQ) as screening questionnaires (see Table 2).
The psychiatrist then sought to validate the symptom examples
provided by the AQ and EQ and checked the other AS symptoms
and criteria.
Healthy control participants matched with the adults with AS
were recruited from a large pool of volunteers. No significant dif-
ferences in age [F(1, 28) = 0.003, p = 0.95], gender [X2(1) = 0.012,
p = 0.91], handedness [X2(1) = 0.00, p = 1.00] or years of for-
mal education [F(1, 28) = 1.36, p = 0.25] were observed between
adults with AS and controls.
The following exclusion criteria were applied: (1) AS partic-
ipants who met DSM-IV criteria for any axis-I diagnosis were
excluded; (2) control subjects with a history of mental retar-
dation, neurological disease, psychiatric disease, or any clinical
condition that may affect cognitive performance were excluded;
(3) adults with AS and controls with a history of drug or alco-
hol abuse were also excluded. All participants provided written
informed consent in agreement with the Helsinki declaration.
The study was approved by the ethics committee of Institute of
Cognitive Neurology.
MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE
A battery of neuropsychological tests was used to assess EF and
social cognition (see below). Patients were also evaluated with
the Wechsler abbreviated scale of intelligence (WASI). This scale
includes vocabulary and matrix reasoning subtests and provides
an estimated IQ (Weschler, 1999). All participants were indi-
vidually evaluated in a quiet office of the Institute of Cognitive
Neurology. A complete evaluation was administrated in one ses-
sion that lasted approximately 2 h. Subjects were initially assessed
with the social cognition tasks and then with the EF and intellec-
tual level tests. The order of administration of the tasks was the
same for each participant.
EF assessment
All participants were evaluated with an EF battery which included
measures of verbal fluency, inhibitory control, interference con-
trol, working memory, and cognitive flexibility. Verbal and design
fluency tests (Delis and Kaplan, 2001) were used to assess recall,
self-monitoring, and cognitive flexibility strategies. The trail-
making test (Partington, 1949) was employed to assess cognitive
flexibility and processing speed, and the Hayling test (Burgess
and Shallice, 1996) was used to measure inhibitory control. The
Flanker test (Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974) was applied to evalu-
ate the ability to inhibit responses to irrelevant stimuli and the
executive control of attention. The set shifting task (Diamond
and Kirkham, 2005) was used to assess cognitive flexibility and
inhibitory control. Finally, a span counting task (Case et al., 1982)
and the 1-back test (Gevins and Cutillo, 1993) were applied to
evaluate working memory.
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Measures of social cognition
A description of social cognition tasks is provided in Table 1.
All participants were evaluated with a social cognition battery
that included measures of emotion recognition, ToM, empathy,
moral judgment, social norms knowledge, and self-monitoring
behavior in social settings. The awareness of social inference
test (TASIT) (McDonald et al., 2003, 2006; Kipps et al., 2009)
was used to assess recognition of emotional states. This task
introduces contextual cues (e.g., prosody, facial movement, and
gestures) and additional processing demands (e.g., adequate
speed of information processing, selective attention, and social
reasoning) that are not taxed when viewing static displays.
The RMET (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997) and the FPT (Stone et al.,
1998) were applied to assess emotional and cognitive aspects
of the ToM. An empathy for pain task (EPT; Couto et al.,
2012) was employed to evaluate the empathy in the context of
intentional and accidental harms. We also used the interper-
sonal reactivity index (IRI; Davis, 1983), a 28-item self-report
questionnaire that measures both the cognitive and affective
components of empathy. Finally, we included a moral judg-
ment task (Young et al., 2010) and the revised self-monitoring
scale (RSMS) (Lennox and Wolfe, 1984). A detailed descrip-
tion of the social cognition tasks is provided in supplemen-
tary data.
Table 1 | Social cognition domain assessed and tasks employed.
Social cognition
domain
Task Description
Emotional processing TASIT This task assesses recognition of emotional expressions. The test introduces contextual cues and additional
processing demands that are not taxed when viewing static displays.
Theory of mind RMET This test assesses the emotional inference aspect of the ToM. Consist of 17 pictures of the eye region of a face.
Participants are asked to choose which of four words best describes what the person in each photograph is
thinking or feeling.
FPT The FPT assesses the emotional and cognitive inference aspects of the ToM. In this task, the participants read
stories that may contain a social faux pas. The subject is asked whether someone said something awkward.
Performance was scored regarding the adequate identification of the faux pas (hits) and the adequate rejection of
those stories which did not contain a faux pas (rejects). A total score was computed by adding the number of hits
and rejects. When a faux pas was correctly identified, subjects were also asked 2 additional questions to measure
intentionality—that is, recognizing that the person committing the faux pas was unaware that they had said
something inappropriate—and emotional attribution, in which participants should recognize that the person hearing
the faux pas might have felt hurt or insulted.
Empathy EPT This task evaluates the empathy in the context of intentional and accidental harms. Consists of 25 animated
situations involving two individuals that are presented successively. The three following kinds of situations were
depicted: intentional pain in which one person is in a painful situation caused intentionally by another; accidental
pain where one person is in a painful situation accidentally caused by another; and control or neutral situations. We
assessed 7 questions about the following aspects of the scenarios: intentionality; emphatic concern; degree of
discomfort; harmful behavior; the valence behavior of the active perpetrator; the correctness of the action, and
finally punishment (see Appendix for a detailed description). Each question was answered using a computer-based
visual analog scale giving 7 different ratings by trial. Accuracy, reaction times (RTs) and ratings were measured.
IRI The IRI is a 28-item self-report questionnaire that separately measures both the cognitive and affective
components of empathy.
Moral judgment Moral
judgment
task
We presented participants with 24 scenarios with four possible variations following a 2 × 2 design: (1) the
protagonists either harmed another person (negative outcome) or did no harm (neutral outcome); (2) the
protagonists either believed that they would cause harm (negative intent) or believed that they would cause no
harm (neutral intent). Participants were asked to rate the scenario on a Likert scale ranging from totally permissible
(7) to totally forbidden (1).
Social norms
knowledge
SNQ The SNQ questionnaire consisting of 20 yes–no questions. The participants were asked to determine whether a
behavior would be appropriate in the presence of an acquaintance according to the mainstream culture.
Self-monitoring
behavior in social
settings
RSMS The RSMS is a 13-item instrument and assesses the tendency to regulate one’s behavior to present a particular self
in a social context. The scale involves two styles of self-monitoring behavior: the ability to modify self-presentation
and the sensitivity to the expressive behavior of others.
TASIT, The awareness of social inference test; RMET, Reading the mind in the eyes test; FPT, Faux Pas test; EPT, empathy for pain task; IRI, index of interpersonal
reactivity; SNQ, social norms questionnaire; RSMS, revised self-monitoring scale.
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DATA ANALYSIS
The demographic, neuropsychological, and experimental data
were compared between the groups using ANOVA and Tukey’s
HSD post-hoc test (when appropriate). The ANOVA results were
also corrected for multiple comparisons using the Tukey’s test.
When analyzing categorical variables (e.g., gender), χ2 square
tests were applied. To control for the influence of EF on the per-
formance on social cognition tasks, we applied an ANCOVA test
that was adjusted for the cognitive flexibility score. The α value
for all statistical tests was set at 0.05.
To assess individual differences, we conducted a MCSA and
compared each participant with the control group on every
performance measure. We followed the method of Towgood
et al. (2009) and used a threshold of 2 standard deviations
(SD) from the mean of the control group to define the nor-
mal range. First, we identified control subjects who displayed
abnormal performance in each sub-measure, according to the 2
SD criteria, and removed them. Then, we recomputed the con-
trol means and SD excluding these subjects and identified adults
with AS and control participants who were below (minus 2 SD)
or above (plus 2 SD) the controls mean. We carried out fre-
quency analyses in order to record the instances in which the
performance of each subject was subnormal or supranormal. We
then used non-parametric tests (Mann–Whitney tests) to com-
pare the number of measures of impaired and supra-normal
performance.
Finally, Pearson’s correlations were performed to examine the
association between the EF measures with the greatest variabil-
ity, and the total scores on the social cognition tasks that were
significantly different between groups.
RESULTS
Table 2 shows the overall results from the demographic and EF
assessment.
EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS ASSESSMENT
The results showed that our groups have similar EF performance.
No differences in verbal fluency, inhibitory control, interference
control, or working memory were observed (Table 2). However,
the adults with AS performed significantly lower than controls
on the switching design fluency task [F(1, 28) = 5.10, p < 0.05],
suggesting subtle cognitive flexibility impairments. Given these
results, we considered this measure as a covariate in the social
cognition performance analysis.
MEASURES OF SOCIAL COGNITION
Figure 1 summarizes the significant differences between groups.
Recognition of emotional states
No significant differences in the TASIT total score were
observed [F(1, 28) = 0.69, p = 0.41]. The per category analy-
sis showed significant differences between groups [F(4, 108) =
7.97, p < 0.01]. A post-hoc analysis (Tukey HSD, MS = 0.49,
df = 134.13) revealed that adults with AS had difficulty with
disgust categorization (p < 0.01). This effect was preserved
(p < 0.01) after co-varying for cognitive flexibility (p = 0.35).
No significant differences were observed for anger (p = 1),
Table 2 | Demographic and executive functions assessment.
AS Control P
(n = 15) (n = 15)
DEMOGRAPHICS
Age (years) 35.46 (11.86) 35.7 (11.52) 0.95
Gender (M:F) 11:4 11:4 0.91
Education (years) 15.33 (3.55) 16.66 (2.60) 0.25
WAT 39.21 (4.09) 39.07 (4.81) 0.93
Handedness (L:R) 0:15 0:15 1.00
Autism Spectrum Quotient 34.14 (6.17) − −
Empathy Quotient 18.57 (10.53) − −
EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS
Phonological fluency 13.10 (4.78) 14.92 (2.43) 0.21
Simple design fluency 8.50 (2.71) 10.00 (3.01) 0.17
Switching design fluency 8.9 (2.70) 11.14 (2.47) 0.03
T.M.T-B 74.50 (27.23) 63.30 (14.17) 0.19
Hayling Test 9.07 (7.36) 6.00 (3.89) 0.19
Flanker Task
Reaction Time (congruent) 667.32 (164.66) 629.11 (134.89) 0.52
Accuracy (congruent) 99.71 (0.89) 99.77 (0.83) 0.85
Reaction Time (incongruent) 718.50 (145.11) 713.19 (121.49) 0.91
Accuracy (incongruent) 98.57(2.45) 98.65 (2.02) 0.92
Set Shifting Task
Reaction Time (shape) 602.15 (118.08) 632.04 (191.65) 0.43
Accuracy (shape) 93.74(2.78) 97.91 (3.56) 0.38
Reaction Time (color) 654.78 (314.38) 588.42 (130.57) 0.47
Accuracy (color) 97.91 (4.27) 98.47 (2.12) 0.67
Reaction Time (incongruent) 794.03 (166.71) 745.03 (192.72) 0.24
Accuracy (incongruent) 95.82 (2.84) 96.42 (2.65) 0.59
1-Back
Reaction Time 870.58 (169.03) 825.90 (173.86) 0.50
Accuracy 90.24 (12.59) 88.80 (8.53) 0.72
Dot counting task 23.92 (11.16) 24.28 (11.11) 0.93
Note: The results are shown as the mean (SD). Statistical results are shown in
the right column. Significant differences are in bold.
TMT, Trail Making Test; WAT, Word accentuation test.
fear (p = 0.22), sadness (p = 0.11) or surprise (p = 0.74)
categorization.
Theory of mind
For the ToM measures, the adults with AS scored significantly
lower than controls on the FPT total score [F(1, 28) = 20.62,
p < 0.01]. This result did not change (p < 0.01) after adjusting
for cognitive flexibility (p = 0.15). Significant differences were
also observed on the hits [F(1, 28) = 20.62, p < 0.01]. Differences
were preserved (p < 0.01) after co-varying for cognitive flexi-
bility (p = 0.13). The AS group also showed lower intentional-
ity scores [F(1, 28) = 74.21, p < 0.01]. This effect was preserved
(p < 0.01) in the covariate analysis (p = 0.41). Furthermore,
adults with AS scored lower on emotional attribution [F(1, 28) =
29.08, p < 0.01]. This effect was maintained (p < 0.01) after
adjusting for the covariate (p = 0.43). No significant differ-
ences were observed on the reject scores [F(1, 28) = 0.007,
p = 0.93].
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FIGURE 1 | Significant differences between groups in social cognition
tasks. (A) TASIT (accuracy per category). A, anger; D, disgust; SD,
sadness; F, fear; SR, surprise. (B) Faux pas test (total score). (C)
Scores on IRI subscales. EC, empathic concern; PD, personal distress;
PT, perspective taking; F, fantasy. (D) Empathy for pain task, ratings for
intentional pain situations. EC, empathic concern; DS, discomfort; IH,
intention to hurt; H, happiness; C, correctness; P, punishment. (E)
Scores on RSMS subscales. SEBO, sensitivity for expression behavior
of others; AMSP, ability to modify self-presentation; DMSP, difficulty to
modify self-presentation.
No differences between the groups were observed on the
RMET [F(1, 28) = 0.09, p = 0.76].
Empathy
Empathy for pain task. The ratings of empathic concern were
significantly different between groups [F(2, 52) = 6.70, p < 0.01].
A post-hoc analysis (Tukey HSD, MS = 10.62, df = 55.08)
revealed that the adults with AS rated the intentional pain situa-
tions with lower scores (p < 0.01), even controlling for cognitive
flexibility (p = 0.65). Furthermore, the controls rated greater
empathic concern for intentional harm situations than acciden-
tal harm situations (p < 0.01). However, this difference was not
observed in the adults with AS. Moreover, significant group dif-
ferences were observed in the punishment ratings [F(2, 52) = 7.02,
p < 0.01]. The post-hoc comparisons (Tukey HSD, MS = 6.87,
df = 66.7) showed that the adults with AS tended to rate inten-
tional harm situations with lower scores than controls (p = 0.06).
This tendency did not change (p = 0.06) in the covariate analy-
sis (p = 0.93). No differences were observed in the judgments of
discomfort, intention to harm or correctness.
In addition, the RTs of the discomfort judgments were dif-
ferent between groups [F(2,52) = 4.72, p < 0.05]. The RTs of the
discomfort judgments were longer for the intentional harm than
the neutral (p < 0.01) and accidental (p < 0.05) harm situa-
tions. These differences were preserved (p < 0.05) in the covariate
analysis (p = 0.17).
IRI. Adults with AS scored higher on PD subscale [F(1, 28) =
6.02, p < 0.05] than controls. This effect was preserved (p <
0.05) after adjusting for the covariate (p = 0.60). No difference
between groups [F(1,28) = 1.96, p = 0.17] were observed on the
EC subscale. Furthermore, the AS group tended to have lower
scores than controls [F(1,28) = 4.01, p = 0.055] on the PT sub-
scale. This tendency was true (p < 0.01) after controlling for
cognitive flexibility (p = 0.09). No difference between the groups
was observed [F(1, 28) = 0.17, p = 0.67] on the F-subscale.
Moral judgment
In both groups, actions with neutral intentions [F(1, 28) = 146.29,
p < 0.01] and neutral outcomes [F(1, 28) = 24.55, p < 0.01] were
judged to be more permissible than actions with negative inten-
tions and negative outcomes. Accidental harm was judged as
being more permissible than intentional harm (Intention ×
Outcome Interaction) [F(1, 28) = 7.40, p < 0.01]. The group ×
intention × outcome interaction [F(1, 28) = 1.60, p = 0.21] was
not statistically significant. Therefore, the adults with AS and con-
trols did not differ in their judgments of morality. Specifically,
the judgments of the neutral (neutral outcome, neutral intent),
attempted harm (neutral outcome, harmful intent), accidental
harm (harmful outcome, neutral intent), or intentional harm
(harmful outcome, harmful intent) vignettes did not differ
between groups.
Knowledge of social norms
No differences between groups were observed in the break
[F(1, 24) = 0.50, p = 0.48] and over-adhere [F(1, 28) = 0.00, p =
1.00] scores of the SNQ.
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Self-monitoring behavior in social settings
Adults with AS obtained lower scores in the sensitivity for expres-
sion behavior of others compared to controls [F(1, 28) = 29.26
p < 0.01], even after the covariate (p = 0.65). Adults with AS also
received lower scores on the ability to modify self-presentation
[F(1, 28) = 19.40, p < 0.01]. This effect remained true after
the covariate analysis (p < 0.01), even though a significant
effect of cognitive flexibility (p < 0.05) on self-presentation was
observed.
In summary, adults with AS showed impairments on mea-
sures of disgust recognition (TASIT), ToM (FPT), and empathic
concern and punishment ratings for the intentional harm sit-
uations (EPT). Additionally, the adults with AS showed higher
scores on the PD subscale. They also showed lower scores on
subscales of the sensitivity to the expressive behavior of oth-
ers and the ability to modify self-presentation (RSMS). All
differences were preserved after covarying for cognitive flexi-
bility. Overall, adults with AS seem to perform less well in
tasks that require an implicit encoding of socially relevant infor-
mation and automatic context integration. Nevertheless, they
performed as well as controls in tasks in which the social
information was explicitly presented and when the task could
be solved with abstract rules. Finally, the difficulties experi-
enced by the adults with AS were not explained by abnormali-
ties in EF.
MULTIPLE CASE SERIES ANALYSIS (MCSA)
To explore the intra-individual variability in tasks performance
of the AS group, we examined the ranges of z-scores based on
the performance of the control group (Towgood et al., 2009).
The maximum range of performance on each of the 78 mea-
sures in controls was 4.60. Among the adults with AS, more
than 43% of the measures (34/78 sub-measures) showed a z-score
range exceeding the maximum threshold observed in controls.
Specifically, 27.78% (5/18) of the EF measures exceeded the max-
imum range of the control group, whereas 48.33% (29/60) of the
social cognition measures exceeded this range.
A greater number of adults with AS performed atypically
compared with the control group. The individual performance
profiles of each AS and control participants are provided in
Appendix (see Tables A1a,A1b,A2a andA2b). Themeasures that
were the most variable are detailed in Table 3. Most of the adults
with AS performed below normal (<2SD below control group
mean) in both, EF and social cognition measures. With regard
to EF, supra-normal (>2SD above control group mean) perfor-
mance was observed only in the phonological fluency task. They
also obtained supra-normal performance on several EPT mea-
sures. More specifically, the adults with AS showed supra-normal
ratings in tasks involving neutral situations (e.g., discomfort,
intention to hurt, and happiness ratings). In neutral scenarios
in which the actions do not involve the intention to hurting
someone, one would expect lower discomfort or intention to
hurt ratings. Thus, the results suggest that the adults with AS
are unable to discriminate between the neutral, accidental and
intentional pain situations.
Consistent with the group analysis, the MCSA revealed
that the adults with AS performed less well than the
controls. Inter-individual variability (subnormal performance)
was observed on: FPT (60%), TASIT (26.67%), empathic con-
cern rating of intentional pain (33.33%), PD (33.33%), sensitivity
of expression behavior of others (33.33%) and ability to modify
self-presentation (53.33%).
Table 3 | The measures of executive functions and social cognition
reveal variable performance in the AS group.
Measure Range >2SDs <2SDs
(z-scores) (%) (%)
EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS MEASURES
Phonological fluency 8.40 13.33 33.33
Hayling Test 6.68 0 26.67
Trail Making Test-B 6.07 0 26.67
Set Shifting accuracy (color) 5.87 0 13.33
1-Back accuracy 5.08 0 6.66
SOCIAL COGNITION MEASURES
Faux Pas Test 7.39 0 60
The Awareness of Social Inference
Test
6.0 0 20
Over adhere score—Social Norms
Questionnaire
6.86 0 13.33
Break score—Social Norms
Questionnaire
6.22 0 6.66
Empathy Task for Pain
Situation comprehension RT (neutral
situations)
7.71 0 20
Intentionality rating (neutral
situations)
11.23 0 20
Intentionality rating (intentional pain) 10.96 0 13.33
Intentionality rating (accidental pain) 8.05 0 33.33
Emphatic concern rating (intentional
pain)
5.54 0 33.33
Emphatic concern rating (accidental
pain)
5.69 0 6.66
Discomfort rating (neutral situations) 5.67 20 0
Discomfort rating (intentional pain) 6.76 0 33.33
Discomfort RT (intentional pain) 7.52 0 26.67
Discomfort RT (accidental pain) 6.45 0 6.66
Intention to hurt rating (neutral
situations)
5.52 20 0
Intention to hurt RT (neutral
situations)
4.61 0 6.66
Intention to hurt rating (intentional
pain)
8.20 0 26.67
Happiness rating (accidental pain) 4.76 20 0
Happiness RT (neutral situations) 5.70 0 13.33
Correctness rating (neutral situations) 7.40 26.67 0
Correctness RT (neutral situations) 4.82 0 6.66
Correctness rating (intentional pain) 11.09 0 20
Correctness RT (accidental pain) 5.79 0 13.33
Punishment rating (neutral situations) 9.49 33.33 0
Punishment RT (neutral situations) 6.21 0 33.33
Punishment rating (intentional pain) 9.96 6.66 33.33
Punishment RT (intentional pain) 4.96 0 13.33
Punishment RT (accidental pain) 4.99 0 13.33
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To explore the inter-individual variability, we analyzed the
performance of each participant and recorded instances in which
the performance was 2 SDs below or above of the control mean.
A non-parametric test was applied to compare the number of
measures for subnormal and supra-normal performance (see
Table 4). As expected, the adultswithAS showed a greater number
of abnormalmeasures than controls (Mann–WhitneyU = 19.00,
p < 0.01). The AS participants also showed a greater number of
measures in which they performed below control performance
(Mann–Whitney U = 14.00, p < 0.01). However, no significant
differences were observed in the number of measures with supra-
normal performance (Mann–Whitney U = 82.00, p = 0.21).
In summary, the MCSA showed higher variability in the per-
formance of the adults with AS compared with controls. A larger
proportion of the social cognition measures compared to the EF
measures exceeded the maximum range of the z-scores calcu-
lated based on the control group performance. In the AS group
subnormal performance was higher than supra-normal.
ASSOCIATION BETWEEN EF AND SOCIAL COGNITION PERFORMANCE
Finally, we explored the influence of EF on social cognition per-
formance. We examined the correlation between the EF measures
with the greatest variability, and the total scores on the social cog-
nition tasks that were significantly different between groups. No
significant correlations were observed.
DISCUSSION
The primary goal of this study was to examine the performance
of adults with AS on tasks of multiple domains of social cogni-
tion, while assessing the influence of EF. The secondary goal was
to explore individual variability in adults with AS performance
on both the social cognition and EF tasks. Our results suggest
that participants with AS have a fundamental deficit in several
domains of social cognition. We also found that the AS partic-
ipants showed a greater number of social cognition measures
in which they performed below controls’ performance. These
deficits were not explained by abnormalities in EF.
Furthermore, our data suggest that a common mechanism
underlies the deficits in multiple social cognition domains in the
adults with AS. In brief, these participants performed poorly on
tasks (TASIT, FPT, EPT) that imply the ability to implicitly infer
the intentionality of actions and those that require the integration
of mental states (intentions, beliefs, emotions) with contextual
information.
This is the first study in adults with AS to explore the effect of
EF on social cognition performance. Both AS and control groups
Table 4 | Comparison of the number of measures in which each
individual exhibited abnormal performance.
Median SD Range p
Controls: measures supra-normal 0.80 2.41 0−9 0.21
AS: measures supra-normal 2.13 2.55 0−8 −
Controls: measures subnormal 1.60 1.08 0−3 0.000007
AS: measures subnormal 10.33 6.87 1−29 −
Controls: total measures abnormal 2.40 2.87 0−10 0.000027
were similar regarding executive functioning. Moreover, to con-
trol for the effect of EF on performance during social cognition
tasks, we conducted covariance analysis adjusted for cognitive
flexibility, the only domain in which we found group significant
differences. All significant differences in the social cognition mea-
sures remained significant. Moreover, we did not find significant
correlations between scores on the EF measures with higher vari-
ability and those of the social cognition tasks that were different
between groups. Because we selected tasks that were designed to
assess specifically EF and have been utilized extensively to assess
these domains (Partington, 1949; Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974; Case
et al., 1982; Gevins and Cutillo, 1993; Burgess and Shallice, 1996;
Delis and Kaplan, 2001; Diamond and Kirkham, 2005), we con-
sider that the failure to find significant correlations could not be
explained by the lack of the sensitivity of the executive measures.
Instead, the lack of significant correlations may be explained by
the low variability observed in the EF performance, since both
groups had a similar executive functioning and low variability.
Consequently, these results indicate that EF do not seem to play a
major role in the social cognition impairments of adults with AS.
DEFICITS IN SOCIAL COGNITION
We employed an ecological task of contextual inference of emo-
tional states (TASIT) which requires the integration of cues from
face, prosody, gesture, and social context to identify the emotions.
Consistent with previous reports (Ashwin et al., 2007; Falkmer
et al., 2011), our results showed that individuals with AS have
difficulty recognizing expressions of disgust. It has been shown
that the basal ganglia, in parallel with the insula, are involved
in disgust recognition (Calder et al., 2000; Adolphs, 2002; Wang
et al., 2003; Ibáñez et al., 2010a,b). Fronto-insular networks seem
to be crucial for social cognition (Couto et al., 2012). Individuals
with AS show reduced graymatter in the basal ganglia (McAlonan
et al., 2002; Nayate et al., 2005). They also show abnormalities in
the white matter between the basal ganglia and thalamus, which
connects brain areas (amygdala and fusiform gyrus) (McAlonan
et al., 2009). Moreover, adults with AS present smaller volumes in
the insular cortex (Kosaka et al., 2010). Therefore, the deficits in
disgust recognition may be associated with abnormalities in the
basal ganglia and the insula.
As previously reported (Ponnet et al., 2004; Spek et al., 2011),
no differences between AS individuals and controls were found in
ToM as measured by the RMET. Nevertheless, our data showed
that the adults with AS performed poorly on the FPT, which is
consistent with other studies (Zalla et al., 2009; Spek et al., 2011).
In this test, adults with AS failed to identify the faux pas and
to understand them as unintentional actions. Furthermore, they
had difficulties to understand the emotional impact generated by
the faux pas. The discrepancy in the performance between both
ToM tests in the AS group can be explained by the features of
these tasks. First, the FPT presents social scenarios resembling
daily life situations. These tasks that involve real-life social sce-
narios are more sensitive to detect the ToM deficits of individuals
with autism and AS (Klin, 2000). Furthermore, an adequate per-
formance in the FPT involves the capacity to implicitly integrate
cognitive inferences about mental states with empathic under-
standing. This capacity is mediated by the appraisal of contextual
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clues and relevant social elements provided in the scene informa-
tion. Conversely, the RMET can be solved using basic and general
matching strategies to correctly pair the depicted eyes and emo-
tions. Thus, taken together, the ToM results suggest that adults
with AS have difficulty integrating implicit information from the
context and using this information to infer the intentionality and
the emotional impact of the others’ actions.
We employed a more ecologically valid measure of empathy
(EPT) than the self-report questionnaires. In this task, the adults
with AS showed abnormal empathic concern ratings, punishment
ratings, and RTs of discomfort judgments for the intentional pain
situations. Consistent with previous findings (Klin, 2000; Zalla
et al., 2009), our results indicate that these individuals have dif-
ficulty with inferring the intentionality of actions. Information
about intentionality allows us to decide how bad or good an
action is. The deficit in intention inference may have affected the
empathic concern ratings and therefore, the punishment ratings
of the adults with AS.
In addition, the adults with AS showed higher levels of PD
and a trend toward lower levels of PT compared with controls on
the IRI. These results are supported by previous studies (Rogers
et al., 2007; Dziobek et al., 2008). The high PD scores indicate
greater levels of discomfort in interpersonal settings. This finding
may be related to the slower RTs in the AS group for discomfort
judgments in the intentional pain situations. Furthermore, indi-
viduals with AS show higher levels of anxiety (Hurtig et al., 2009;
Lai et al., 2011), which may increase their PD scores. The lower
scores on the PT subscale suggest that individuals with AS have
difficulty understanding the feelings and perspectives of others,
which is congruent with the EPT results.
In summary, the pattern of performance on the empathy mea-
sures indicated that adults with AS are impaired when using
contextual information to infer the intentions of others. These
deficits are reflected by lower ratings of empathic concern and
punishment. Moreover, these individuals show higher levels of
discomfort in stressful interpersonal situations.
Interestingly, we found that adults with AS performed simi-
larly than control participants on measures of moral judgment.
Both groups judged accidental harm as being more permissible
than intentional harm. The lack of difference between groups in
this task may be due to the fact that information about inten-
tion, outcome, and context (scene information) were presented
in an explicit way. Therefore, it was possible to understand the
moral content using two abstract rules with a linear relation-
ship. For example, if the protagonist had the intention of harming
another person (negative intent) and in fact caused harm (neg-
ative outcome); then the protagonist’s action should be morally
forbidden. Our results are in line with previous studies in indi-
viduals with AS (Klin, 2000; Izuma et al., 2011) that have shown
intact performance or subtle deficits on tasks where explicit infor-
mation is available. However, a recent study (Moran et al., 2011)
employing a similar paradigm reported atypical moral judgment
in individuals with AS and HFA. The discrepancy between these
results and the current findings may be explained by the sample
selection criteria employed in each study. Moran and colleagues
included both HFA and AS participants. Individuals with HFA
have language delay and usually present impairments in verbal
skills (Baron-Cohen et al., 2005; Matson and Wilkins, 2008).
These difficulties can affect their performance on the task. Thus,
moral judgment in adults with AS needs to be further studied
using naturalistic social situations without explicit rules.
On the other hand, this is the first attempt to investigate self-
monitoring in social settings in an AS population. As expected, AS
participants were less sensitive to the expressive behavior of other
individuals, indicating that they had a low capacity for detecting
implicit social and interpersonal cues. They also showed a dimin-
ished ability to modify self-presentation in social situations, sug-
gesting that they had difficulty with adjusting their behaviors and
with navigating novel or challenging social situations. Consistent
with this idea, a negative correlation between self-monitoring and
measures of social skills has been reported (Furnham and Capon,
1983). Furthermore, the ability to modify self-presentation is
negatively correlated with social anxiety (Cramer and Gruman,
2002). Thus, the deficits in self-monitoring in social settings may
be related to the lack of social skills and the high levels of anxiety
(Hurtig et al., 2009; Lai et al., 2011) experienced by individuals
with AS.
Moreover, our results revealed no differences between the AS
participants and controls on the SNQ. This finding indicates that
social rules knowledge is preserved in adults with AS. In accor-
dance with our data, a study (Zalla et al., 2011) reported that AS
and high-functioning individuals with autism are able to detect
social rule violations. Furthermore, social norms can be learned
in an explicit way. This explicit knowledge can be used by adults
with AS to guide their behavior and can act as a compensatory
strategy for their social cognition deficits.
Overall, consistent with our hypothesis, the adults with AS
showed impairments in several social cognition domains (emo-
tion recognition, ToM, empathy, and self-monitoring in social
settings). Specifically, the adults with AS performed poorly
on those social cognition tasks (TASIT, FPT, and EPT) that
involve an implicit encoding of socially relevant information and
the automatic integration of contextual information to solve a
given social situation. Conversely, these individuals performed
as well as controls in some tasks (RMET, moral judgment task,
and SNQ) that had common features. In these tasks the ele-
ments of the situation are clearly defined and usually can be
solved with relatively abstract and universal rules. This pattern
of social cognition performance suggests that one underlying
factor may explain the deficits. According to a recently pro-
posed social context network model (Ibáñez and Manes, 2012),
this factor seems to be the implicit encoding and the integra-
tion of contextual information in order to access to the social
meaning.
In addition, our results suggest that adults with AS may benefit
from the use of explicit information. However, in most real-
life situations, the social demands are not explicitly formulated.
Social situations involve implicitly inferring the meaning of the
circumstance by integrating contextual cues. Therefore, the pat-
tern of deficits presented here may partially explain the difficulties
with social interaction that individuals with AS experience in their
daily lives.
Adults with AS may use abstract rules to compensate for
their impairments in social cognition. Previous reports have
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shown that individuals with AS have superior abstract reason-
ing abilities (Hayashi et al., 2008; Soulieres et al., 2011). This
strength may contribute to the performance on social cognition
tasks that require the use of abstract rules and the integra-
tion of explicit information. On the other hand, this superior-
ity in abstract reasoning may not help in social situations that
involve implicit social rules and the integration of contextual
cues. In these situations, the meaning of social information is
less predictable and relies heavily on context, which reduces the
chances of inferring the meaning by applying explicit abstract
rules.
VARIABILITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF ADULTS WITH AS
Adults with AS showed heterogeneous performance on sev-
eral EF and social cognition tasks. These participants obtained
mainly subnormal performance among the measures with the
largest variability. Furthermore, this intra-individual variability
was higher for the performances of social cognition than for
the EF tests. The decreased variability of the EF tasks can be
explained by the intact or superior fluid intelligence in adults
with AS (Hayashi et al., 2008; Soulieres et al., 2011). Fluid intel-
ligence is a major dimension of individual differences and refers
to reasoning, abstract though and novel problem-solving ability
(Duncan et al., 1995; Gray et al., 2003). Previous studies have
suggested that high fluid intelligence is associated with better
scores on EF tasks (Gray et al., 2003; Burgess and Braver, 2010)
and indirectly related to psychosocial cognition (Huepe et al.,
2011).
The current study is the first to explore the intra-individual
variability of social cognition measures in adults with AS.
Consistent with the group analysis, these patients obtained sub-
normal performance on the same tasks (TASIT, FPT, EPT, IRI,
and RSMS). Our data indicates that social cognition performance
of adults with AS does not follow the same pattern of strengths
and weaknesses reported in other cognitive domains (Hill and
Bird, 2006; Towgood et al., 2009). Conversely, the social cognition
patterns of individuals with AS is characterized by sub-normal
performance, suggesting that these deficits are probably the core
of the disorder.
CONCLUSIONS
Our study documents multiple social cognition deficits as fun-
damental features of the AS diagnosis. Our results showed that
adults with AS present deficits in the implicit integration of con-
textual information in order to access to the social meaning.
However, when social information is explicitly presented and the
situation can be solved with abstract rules, the individuals with
AS usually perform as well as controls. We also found that indi-
vidual profiles of adults with AS showed subnormal performance
in social cognition measures.
This is the first report in adults with AS to evaluate mul-
tiple social cognition domains assessing the EF and exploring
inter- and intra-individual variability. However, some limitations
of this study should be acknowledged. First, our sample size
is relatively small, but it is similar to previous social cognition
studies (Dziobek et al., 2008; Zalla et al., 2009; Moran et al.,
2011) and it is also similar to other reports that have explored
the cognitive variability of adults with AS (Hill and Bird, 2006;
Towgood et al., 2009) and other patient populations (Deloche
et al., 1999; Ramus et al., 2003). Moreover, unlike other reports
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Baron-Cohen andWheelwright, 2004;
Moran et al., 2011; Zalla et al., 2011), we only included individ-
uals diagnosed with AS. Second, given the ongoing debate about
the differentiation among autistic subtypes, especially between AS
and HFA, future studies should compare social cognition pro-
files of both conditions. Further research should also explore the
variability patterns of adults with AS compared with HFA. Third,
although AS will probably be formally excluded as a diagnostic
category in the DSM-V, our findings are still relevant for studying
individual differences within autism spectrum disorders and the
subset of people who show a particular profile (previously diag-
nosed as individuals with AS). In the future, detailed scientific
assessments on cognitive domains, such as the ones presented in
this work, may help to identify subcategories of autism spectrum
disorders.
From a theoretical perspective, our findings are relevant for
discussions on social cognition domain specificity in adults
with AS. As previously proposed (Stone and Gerrans, 2006a,b),
our results support a social cognition profile involving differ-
ent degrees of affectation and a heterogeneous profile. These
results do not support a modular or the “all or nothing” struc-
ture of social cognition. Contextual processing seems to affect
the social cognition profile of adults with AS in a dissimi-
lar way. For instance, their performance on social cognition
tasks may be partially explained by the interaction of low-level
mechanisms with the general capacity to integrate contextual
information.
From a clinical perspective, our findings may have impor-
tant implications for the diagnosis and treatment of the AS. The
deficits found in multiple social cognition domains seem to be the
core feature of the AS. It is also important to promote the use of
tasks involving real-life social scenarios because these assessments
are more sensitive to AS impairments (Klin, 2000). “Ecological”
measures are context-sensitive tools that should be applied in
neuropsychiatry (Burgess et al., 2009; Torralva et al., 2009; Ibáñez
and Manes, 2012).
In addition, the traditional social skills interventions for indi-
viduals with AS are based on learning explicit rules to build and
foster relationships with others (Cappadocia and Weiss, 2011).
However, the social skills acquired during those interventions
do not generalize to situations outside of the treatment setting,
which limits the efficacy of these programs (Rao et al., 2008;
Cappadocia and Weiss, 2011). Thus, incorporating naturalistic
environments into treatment may help individuals with AS gen-
eralize the learned social skills. Contextual integration of situated
information seems to be crucial for several cognitive processes
(Ibáñez et al., 2006, 2010a,b, 2011a,b, 2012; Hurtado et al., 2009;
Aravena et al., 2010; Riveros et al., 2010; Amoruso et al., 2011,
2012; Barutta et al., 2011; Couto et al., 2012; Ibáñez and Manes,
2012). Although implementation would be challenging, inter-
vention programs should be based on teaching implicit rules
for interpreting unpredictable social contexts. Learning to assess
implicit contextual clues may improve the social skills of adults
with AS.
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APPENDIX
MEASURES OF SOCIAL COGNITION
RECOGNITION OF EMOTIONAL STATES
The awareness of social inference test (TASIT). The TASIT is a test
of social perception that involves videotaped vignettes of every-
day social interactions (Kipps et al., 2009; McDonald et al., 2003,
2006). This task introduces contextual cues (e.g., prosody, facial
movement, and gestures) and additional processing demands
(e.g., adequate speed of information processing, selective atten-
tion, and social reasoning) that are not taxed when viewing
static displays. We only considered part 1, called the emotion
evaluation test (EET), which assesses recognition of emotional
expression (fearful, surprised, sad, angry, and disgusted). In
the EET, speaker demeanor (voice, facial expression, and ges-
ture) together with the social situation indicate the emotional
meaning. In some scenes, there is only one actor talking, who
is either on the telephone or talking directly to the camera.
Other scenes depict two actors and instructions are given to
focus on one of them. All scripts are neutral in content and do
not lend themselves to any particular emotion. The brief EET
comprises a series of 20 short (15–60 s) videotaped vignettes
of trained professional actors interacting in everyday situations.
After viewing each scene, the test participant is instructed to
choose from a forced-choice list the emotion expressed by the
focused actor.
ToM
Reading the mind in the eyes (RMET)
This test (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997) assesses the emotional infer-
ence aspect of the ToM (or empathic accuracy). This is a comput-
erized and validated test in which consist of 17 pictures of the
eye region of a face. Participants are asked to choose which of
four words best describes what the person in each photograph
is thinking or feeling.
Faux pas test (FPT)
The FPT assesses the emotional and cognitive inference aspects
of the ToM. In this task, the participants read stories that
may contain a social faux pas (Stone et al., 1998). After each
story was read, the subject is asked whether someone said
something awkward (in order to identify stories containing a
faux pas). Each story was presented in front of the patient
in order to decrease working memory load. Performance was
scored regarding the adequate identification of the faux pas
(hits) and the adequate rejection of those stories which did
not contain a faux pas (rejects). The score was 1 point for
each faux pas correctly identified (maximum: 10), or non-
faux pas correctly rejected (maximum: 10). A total score was
computed (out of 20 total points) by adding the number
of hits and rejects. When a faux pas was correctly iden-
tified, subjects were also asked 2 additional questions to
measure intentionality—that is, recognizing that the person
committing the faux pas was unaware that they had said
something inappropriate (maximum 10)—and emotional attri-
bution, in which participants should recognize that the per-
son hearing the faux pas might have felt hurt or insulted
(maximum 10).
EMPATHY
Empathy for pain task (EPT)
The EPT evaluates the empathy in the context of intentional
and accidental harms. The task consists of 25 animated situa-
tions involving two individuals that are presented successively
(Decety et al., 2011). The three following kinds of situations were
depicted: intentional pain in which one person (passive per-
former) is in a painful situation caused intentionally by another
(active performer), e.g., stepping purposely on someone’s toe
(pain caused by other); accidental pain where one person is in
a painful situation accidentally caused by another; and control
or neutral situations (e.g., one person receiving a flower given by
another).
Importantly, the faces of the protagonists are not visible and
there was no emotional reaction visible to the participants. We
measured the ratings and reaction times (RTs) to situation com-
prehension (e.g., “press the button as soon as you understand
the situation”). In addition, we assessed 7 questions about the
following aspects of the scenarios: intentionality, e.g., the acci-
dental or deliberate nature of the action; emphatic concern (how
sad you feel for the victim); degree of discomfort (for the vic-
tim); harmful behavior (how bad was the purpose of the per-
petrator); the valence behavior of the active perpetrator (how
much positive emotion he/she felt in performing the action); the
correctness of the action (moral judgment); and finally punish-
ment (how much penalty this action deserves). Each question
was answered using a computer-based visual analogue scale giv-
ing 7 different ratings by trial. Accuracy, RTs and ratings were
measured.
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (Davis, 1983). The IRI
is a 28-item self-report questionnaire that separately mea-
sures both the cognitive and affective components of empa-
thy. The instrument contains four scales: Perspective Taking
(PT), Empathic Concern (EC), Fantasy (F), and Personal
Distress (PD).
MORAL JUDGMENT
Moral judgment task
Following the protocol reported elsewhere (Young et al., 2010),
we presented participants with 24 scenarios. The four variations
of each scenario followed a 2 × 2 design: (1) the protagonists
either harmed another person (negative outcome) or did no
harm (neutral outcome); (2) the protagonists either believed
that they would cause harm (negative intent) or believed that
they would cause no harm (neutral intent). Each possible belief
was true for one outcome and false for the other outcome. The
agent held true beliefs in the all-neutral and all-negative con-
ditions and false beliefs in the accidental harm and attempted
harm conditions. The participants saw one version of each sce-
nario. In total, eight possible versions of the 24 scenarios with
six trials of each of the four conditions were presented. The
stimuli were presented in a pseudorandom order and the condi-
tions were counterbalanced across participants. Each participant
read six stories in each of the four conditions. After reading
each story, the participants were asked to rate the scenario on
a Likert-scale ranging from totally permissible (7) to totally
forbidden (1).
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SOCIAL NORMS KNOWLEDGE
Social norms questionnaire (SNQ)
The SNQ questionnaire consisting of 20 yes–no questions was
used (Rankin et al., 2009). The participants were asked to deter-
mine whether a behavior would be appropriate in the presence of
an acquaintance (not a close friend or family member) according
to the mainstream culture. Two scores were derived. The break
score was defined as the total number of errors made in the direc-
tion of breaking a social norm, and the over-adhere score was
defined as the total number of errors made in the direction of
over adherence to a perceived social norm.
SELF-MONITORING BEHAVIOR IN SOCIAL SETTINGS
Revised self-monitoring scale (RSMS)
The RSMS is a 13-item instrument and assesses the tendency to
regulate one’s behavior to present a particular self in a social con-
text (Lennox and Wolfe, 1984). The scale involves two styles of
self-monitoring behavior: the ability to modify self-presentation
(e.g., “in social situations, I have the ability to alter my behavior
if I feel that something else is called for”) and the sensitiv-
ity to the expressive behavior of others (e.g., “I am often able
to read people’s true emotions correctly through their eyes”).
The participants responded using a 6-point Likert-scale. The
ratings ranged from 0 = “strongly disagree” to 5 = “strongly
agree.”
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